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ABSTRACT 
     An investigation was made into the premature failure of a gas-header at the Rocky Mountain Oilfield 
Testing Center (RMOTC) natural gas production facility. A wide variety of possible failure mechanisms 
were considered: design of the header, deviation from normal pipe alloy composition, physical 
orientation of the header, gas composition and flow rate, type of corrosion, protectiveness of the interior 
oxide film, time of wetness, and erosion-corrosion. The failed header was examined using 
metallographic techniques, scanning electron microscopy, and microanalysis. A comparison of the 
failure site and an analogous site that had not failed, but exhibited similar metal thinning was also 
performed. From these studies it was concluded that failure resulted from erosion-corrosion, and that 
design elements of the header and orientation with respect to gas flow contributed to the mass loss at the 
failure point.  
Keywords: corrosion, natural gas, gas-header, erosion-corrosion, gas flow, velocity effects, corrosion 
fatigue 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
    An investigation was made into the premature failure of a gas-header in a natural gas production 
facility. The location of the failure and the nature of the observed mass loss at the failure site suggested 
that erosion-corrosion was the cause. Because of conditions present at the failure, a wide variety of 
possible failure mechanisms were considered in addition to erosion-corrosion: design of the header, 
deviation from normal pipe alloy composition, physical orientation of the header, gas composition and 
flow rate, type of corrosion, protectiveness of the interior oxide film, and time of wetness.  
       
    Internal corrosion in some natural gas transmission systems can be a serious problem due to the 
presence of water vapor, carbon dioxide, and hydrogen sulfide in the vapor phase. For a variety of 
reasons, process irregularities (such as maintenance periods) may also lead to the presence of liquid 
water within the pipeline, some of which may carry over when normal processes are restored. The liquid 
water tends to accumulate at low spots or at least on horizontal surfaces in the system accelerating 
corrosion.1  
      
     Pipeline corrosion may cause unscheduled maintenance, repair, or downtime, and in worst cases can 
lead to catastrophic failure that can adversely affect health, safety, the environment, and production 
costs. In 2002 the U.S. Office of Pipeline Safety indicated that $3,711,443 in costs and over 17% of all 
pipeline damage was due to internal corrosion of gas transmission pipelines.1 To minimize these impacts 
to the public and to pipeline operations, operators will try to limit corrosion damage by managing for 
general corrosion through the use of chemical inhibitors, through in-line inspections (ILI), and through 
keeping gas temperatures above the dew point.  
 
    For many natural gas pipelines internal general corrosion begins with CO2 corrosion, the reaction of 
iron from the pipe with aqueous bicarbonate to produce scale (iron carbonate), water and carbon 
dioxide.  
 
Fe + 2HCO3- → FeCO3 + H2O + CO2 + 2e-                                                        (1)  
 
Conditions in the pipeline usually favor the formation of FeCO3 scale.2 How protective the FeCO3 scale 
is depends upon the pipeline environment. Iron carbonate decreases in solubility with increasing 
temperature and becomes less protective during upsets when temperature declines. Factors such as gas 
velocity, pH, and composition (H2S, chloride, bicarbonate, liquid hydrocarbon, and water content) all 
affect the protectiveness of the iron carbonate scale, and thus the internal corrosion rate. The presence of 
H2S can lead to the formation of an iron sulfide film, which is initially protective, but can prevent 
formation of the iron carbonate and can lead to increased corrosion at low pH. Liquid hydrocarbons are 
generally protective when they are present, since they provide a barrier to the more corrosive species in 
the gas, but at high flow rates they can be easily removed, leading to an increase in the corrosion rate.1
 
    Velocity effects may also contribute to localized corrosion. Pitting requires the formation of corrosion 
product scales that have local defects. These defects may be caused by mechanical damage due to 
hydro-mechanical attack and to non-uniform growth of the scale, but also to velocity effects of the gas 
flowing in the pipe, with or without solid particle (usually sand) impingement. Although erosion-
corrosion usually requires multiple phases, single phase flows can impress small magnitude stresses on 
the protective scale covering the pipe wall. This is particularly true in smaller diameter pipes and at an 
“elbows” or “Ts” where gas flow is directed at the scale on the pipe wall. At high gas velocities, even in 
the absence of solid particles, flow effects may prohibit formation of the protective FeCO3 scale.3-4     
 
     Although initially protective, FeCO3 is subject to cracking and spalling above a thickness of 70 µm.5 
Local flow rates and environmental conditions determine if the FeCO3 will reform once spalling has 
occurred. The roughness of the scale itself can give rise to micro-turbulences which can cause localized 
thinning of the scale with the formation of pores. Higher corrosion activity at the porous locations result 
in additional localized thinning of the scale, followed by further corrosion due to the inability of the 
scale to reform because of the high local flow intensities. In such cases penetration rates are much 
greater than for uniform corrosion and complete pipe wall penetration may occur quickly and without 
warning.5 Thinning walls may also undergo mechanical expansion (pressurized gas line), which can also 
accelerate failure. If the pipe wall has thinned enough, it may cause “holdup” where the thinning has 
created an angle in the pipe wall sufficient to restrict normal flow, causing a location of persistent liquid 
water.  Frequently, the use of larger diameter pipe can reduce velocities to the point where these types of 
corrosion don’t take place.3-4
 
    Another type of corrosion that is also flow related, Flow-Induced Sweet Corrosion (FIS), may occur 
when there are conditions of uneven flow, formation of FeCO3 scale of uneven protectiveness, uneven 
ferrous iron saturation rate, and the presence of liquid hydrocarbons. In addition, FIS occurs in a narrow 
temperature range, usually 70° C to 110° C. Lighter hydrocarbons are more prone to cause FIS, and in 
pipelines with a significant fraction of liquid hydrocarbons, conditions may arise where a liquid water 
phase in contact with the pipe metal may be protected by a hydrocarbon saturated scale.6 In pipelines 
using an inhibitor, the liquid hydrocarbons may condense on the surface of the inhibitor at the bottom of 
a horizontal pipe, restricting the ability of the inhibitor to absorb water from the gas phase.7 During 
upsets, the liquid water content in the pipe may rise considerably through condensation from the gas 
phase. If inhibitors or liquid hydrocarbons are present they may prevent the evaporation of the water 
back to the vapor phase by forming a protective boundary between the gas phase and the water layer. A 
similar effect can occur when water vapor reaches a section of pipe at a slightly lower temperature. If 
the water content is high enough it will condense and tend to collect on any low areas in the pipe. This 
problem usually occurs when insulated or buried pipe emerges into an unheated environment, where 
external temperatures are significantly lower than the internal gas temperature.8     
      
    The Rocky Mountain Oilfield Testing Center (RMOTC) is located within the Naval Petroleum 
Reserve No. 3 near Casper, Wyoming. For several years, the National Energy Technology Laboratory 
(NETL) in Albany, Oregon has undertaken cooperative research with RMOTC on a variety of corrosion 
related issues.9-13 One project involved the investigation of a header failure at the Naval Reserve Gas 
Plant No. 3. This particular facility extracts propane, butane, and higher carbon chain compounds from 
the gas stream, and returns the methane and ethane to the well (Table 1). The failed header (Figure 1) is 
located on a section of exposed pipe. Two vertical 3 inch (7.62 cm) internal diameter (ID) pipes enter 
the 4 inch (10.16 cm) ID header from the top and exit through a single 3 inch (7.62 cm) ID pipe from the 
bottom. The failure occurred directly beneath the junction of one of the vertical pipes (Figure 2). A 
patch was welded over the failed header, which was returned to service until it was replaced. The failed 
header was then sent to NETL in Albany for evaluation.  
 
EXPERIMENTAL DETAILS 
 
    The failed gas-header received from RMOTC was photographed, cut into sections and subjected to a 
number of tests including: metallographic analysis, micro-hardness, chemical analysis, x-ray diffraction, 
and scanning electron microscopic and x-ray microanalysis. After sectioning the pipe, extensive 
photographs were taken to show the nature and extent of the metal thinning at both the failed site and an 
analogous site that exhibited metal thinning but did not fail. Gas compositions and flow rates as well as 
a record of production upsets for the service life of the failed pipe section were supplied by RMOTC. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
    The failed pipe, a two inlet-one outlet gas-header (Figure 1), had been in service at the Naval Gas 
Plant No. 3 from February, 1984, until September, 2005. On January 21, 2003 the header failed, a patch 
was welded over the failure site, and the header remained in service until September, 2005. The header 
was located upstream from the point where inhibitor (glycol) was added to the stream, so inhibitor 
should not have been present at the failure site. As received by NETL, the ruptured metal from the 
failure was internal to the pipe, the opposite of what should be expected from a rupture of pressurized 
pipe. It is believed that at the time the patch was put in place, the welder pushed the ruptured metal back 
into the pipe to make the installation of the patch easier, and that the ruptured metal originally extended 
outwards from the pressurized pipe (Figure 2 and Figure 7). During the period in which the patched gas 
header was still in service, NETL staff performed corrosion rate measurements on the vertical section of 
pipe below the failed header (Figure 1). Using multi-technique electrochemical corrosion rate (ECR) 
monitoring devices (electrochemical noise, linear polarization rate, and harmonic distortion analysis), it 
was determined that the corrosion rate averaged 5.5 µm/yr (0.22 mpy) on this vertical section. The mass 
loss rate for the failed header (wall thickness 0.25 inches) was much higher, exceeding 325 µm/yr (13 
mpy), even though gas compositions and temperatures for both areas were identical. Scale from the 
vertical section was examined by x-ray diffraction and found to contain a primary phase of FeCO3 
(siderite), a secondary phase of FeS2 (pyrite), and a trace of FeS (mackinawite). It was also found that 
variations in temperature did not affect the corrosion rate at the vertical site. A low electrochemical 
noise pitting factor (0.019) indicated that only general corrosion was significant in the vertical section 
where corrosion measurements were made.9 Chemical analysis of the aqueous phase condensed from the 
gas stream indicated that Cl was present at 0.31 ppm, NO3 was present at 0.20 ppm, F was present at 7.8 
ppm, SO4 was present at 20.6 ppm, and CN, NO2, SO3, Fe2+, and PO4 were all present at less than  
0.4 ppm.9-13  
 
    Because of the low corrosion rate on the vertical section of pipe in comparison with the much higher 
mass loss rate at the gas-header, a failure mechanism for the gas header must involve either the 
horizontal orientation of the failed pipe and/or the effect of gas flow impacting the horizontal pipe from 
the vertical inlet (Figure 3) and/or design elements in the gas header. Each of these possibilities was 
examined. 
 
Contributions of Header Design Elements to Failure 
 
   A visual examination was made of the failed gas header before and after sectioning. The gas header 
was fabricated by welding together three separate parts: (1) the outlet, a “T”, of 0.375 inch wall 
thickness pipe; (2) and (3) the two inlets which were produced by welding a collar/flange assembly 
directly to the 0.250 inch (6.35 mm) wall thickness pipe producing a “T” (Figure 3). Each of the inlet 
sections was welded to an end cap, and the two inlet “T”’ sections were welded to the central outlet “T”. 
Because the collar/flange assembly was welded directly to the pipe on the two inlet sections, the hole cut 
in the pipe was slightly smaller at 2 7/8 inch (7.30 cm) ID than the vertical inlet pipe (3 inch ID). This 
narrowing could increase the flow of gas that would strike the opposite wall (failure site) of the inlet 
“T”. The welding of the two inlet sections to the outlet section produced a welded joint of two different 
wall thicknesses, 0.375 inches (9.53 mm) for the outlet and 0.250 inches (6.35 mm) for the inlets. The 
result was a raised circular area around the inner circumference of the pipe between the inlets and outlet 
(Figure 4). This would create a holdup, preventing any liquids entrained in the gas stream and collecting 
in the bottom of the inlet sections from draining to the outlet. In this case, the time of wetness in the 
bottom of the inlet sections would be much greater than other sections of the pipe. Both inlet sections 
exhibited drastic metal thinning opposite the vertical inlets although only one section failed. 
 
    A micro-hardness test was performed on the thinned metal on the inlet section that did not fail. The 
test was performed at the bottom of the section parallel to pipe length. A decrease in hardness was noted 
in the thinned portion compared to the original pipe wall (Figure 5). The cause of this difference in 
hardness was not determined, but it is believed not important to the cause of failure. Although the 
original specifications for the composition of the header were not available, a chemical analysis of the 
metal near the failed section did not reveal any significant variation from pipe steel (Table 2) and metal 
composition was not suspected as a cause of the failure.  
 
    The failure site was mounted in epoxy and etched with nital (98% methanol and 2% HNO3). Optical 
microscopy revealed a gradient of increasing pearlite towards the gas side of the failure (Figure 6). The 
gradient may indicate increasing carbon content in the metal towards the gas side probably due to 
corrosion. 
 
Contribution of Orientation to Header Failure 
 
    In the section of pipe containing the failure, only the header had a horizontal orientation. As noted 
above, corrosion tends to be greater at low spots in a system.1 In the case of the failed header, the barrier 
created by the weld between the inlet section and the outlet made the site of the failure the “low spot” in 
the system. Although not directly observed, because the interior of the header was only inspected at 
NETL after being shipped from RMOTC, condensed liquids would tend to pool in the area below the 
vertical inlets because of the holdup caused by the weld. In addition, a significant stretch of vertical 
tubing exposed to ambient temperatures would tend to channel condensed liquids into the header. 
Information provided by RMOTC detailed numerous upsets during the 20 year life of the header that 
could lead to long periods of wetness, especially if liquid hydrocarbons condensing from the gas stream 
created a cap over the water phase, insulating the water from the gas stream. Temperatures in the gas 
stream varied from 100° to 160° F (38° to 71° C). At the low end of this range, condensation would be 
possible in the exposed pipe (particularly in the winter) even under normal operation.  In comparison 
with adjacent “dry” metal in the pipe, the wet section would become strongly anodic, resulting in the 
potential for accelerated corrosion. The wetness would also affect the protectiveness of any scale that 
formed in that area, changing the scale composition and potentially degrading its physical strength.  
 
   Visual examination of the failure site (Figure 7) showed a dramatic difference in the scale immediately 
surrounding the failure when compared to the scale in the rest of the pipe. At the failure site, the scale 
was observed to be very thin and reddish, while a short distance away, it appeared to be much thicker 
and darker. A dark band extending around the failure was determined to be caused by the welding of the 
patch to the header (Figure 4). X-ray diffraction of the scale close to the failure site gave a primary 
phase of Fe2O3 (hematite), a secondary phase of Fe3O4 (magnetite), and only a trace of FeCO3 (siderite). 
Normally, FeCO3 would be the predominant scale component as was found in the vertical section of 
pipe below the header.10-13Either conditions favored the formation of hematite in the area of the failure, 
or most of the FeCO3 formed was eroded away by gas flow. 
 
    Scanning electron micrographs, x-ray microanalysis, and x-ray elemental maps provided information 
about the concentration of carbon, iron, oxygen and trace elements in the area immediately adjacent to 
the failure (Figure 8). Most of the outer scale appeared to be hematite with small areas of siderite. A thin 
layer next to the metal surface gave evidence of sulfide corrosion. Areas underneath the outer layer of 
the scale appeared to be hydrocarbons (low Fe, low O, high C), or scale saturated with hydrocarbons 
(Figure 8). This data suggests that at the failure site conditions existed that suppressed the reforming of 
FeCO3 scale and instead favored hematite formation. Protectiveness may have been further degraded by 
the scale being saturated with liquid hydrocarbons. A water layer in which active sulfide corrosion was 
occurring may have persisted next to the metal surface. This water layer may have been insulated from 
the gas stream by the hydrocarbon saturated scale and extended the time of wetness in the area of the 
failure. 
 
Contribution of Gas Flow to Gas Header Failure  
 
    The location of the failure directly opposite the inlet stream of gas is a strong indication that gas flow 
effects contributed to the failure. Metal thinning of the header, likely caused by the combination of 
erosion and corrosion, directly corresponds to the flow pattern of the gas expected from the inlet (Figure 
9). The absence of FeCO3 from the scale, and the reduction of scale thickness to almost bare metal in the 
area around the failure, are more indications of impingement effects from the gas stream. A backscatter 
SEM micrograph of the area shows cracking, spalling, and erosion features on the surface of the scale 
caused by the gas flow (Figure 10). The hydrocarbon saturated scale was very susceptible to erosion by 
the gas stream. Examination of the vertical inlet pipe showed areas of scale that had spalled off the 
vertical pipe walls. This spalled scale likely was carried in the gas stream to impact the header, creating 
a two-phase impingement attack (gas plus scale particles). The SEM image does reveal areas that 
resemble solids impingement. RMOTC reported no sand or other solids in the gas stream, so that solids 
impingement is likely due to spalled scale alone. Once metal thinning had started, erosion effects would 
accelerate as the height of the holdup at the eventual failure site increased. After considerable metal 
thinning and shortly before failure, a reduction in the insulation of the metal to the outside weather may 
have subjected the water layer trapped by the holdup to temperatures closer to outside ambient 
temperature. Shortly before the failure occurred , the pipe metal may have thinned to the point that 
internal pressures would produce noticeable stresses on the remaining metal. An SEM backscatter image 
(Figure 11) of the exterior of the header (outer painted side) near the failure point shows evidence of 
corrosion fatigue cracking.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
    The failure of the gas-header at RMOTC was caused by erosion-corrosion from gas flow directly 
hitting an area undergoing active corrosion. Protectiveness of the scale was reduced by wetting from 
water and liquid hydrocarbons. The erosion may have included particles of scale that spalled off of pipe 
walls above the failure. 
 
    Design elements of the header that contributed to the failure included differing pipe wall thickness 
between the outlet “T” and the inlet sections of the header, and the raised weld joint between the outlet 
“T” and the inlet sections. These defects created a holdup, which prevented condensed liquids from 
flowing to the outlet. Elimination of the raised weld and using larger wall thicknesses in the pipe would 
help counteract these problems. 
 
    The horizontal orientation of the header created a low spot in the system, which created a pool of 
condensed liquids on the horizontal surface and increasing the time of wetness. This pool of liquids 
saturated the scale and made it less protective of the metal and subject to removal by impingement of the 
gas flow. The vertical inlet pipes directed gas flow directly on the horizontal surface, precisely where 
active aqueous corrosion was taking place. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
    The use of a header with different design elements would reduce the conditions that led to the failure. 
Having the inlets feed into the header from the side rather than being directed against the horizontal 
surface would alleviate the problem of direct gas flow against the area of most rapid corrosion, and 
would reduce any erosion-corrosion effects from two phase impingement from scale carried in the gas 
stream. Use of a larger diameter header would also reduce the impingement effects on the pipe opposite 
the inlet, as well as reduce pressure effects. A header in which horizontal surfaces are minimized and 
gas flow is not directed at the pipe wall (a “Y” design) would be a possible solution to the observed 
erosion-corrosion failure (Figure 12). 
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Table 1 
Composition of  Production Well Naval 
Reserve Gas Plant No.3 (source RMOTC) 
Component Percent 
Air 1.61 
Methane 86.48 
CO2 2.67 
Ethane 5.11 
Propane 2.14 
Iso-butane 0.26 
Normal-butane 0.60 
Iso-pentane 0.20 
Normal-pentane 0.21 
Hexane + 0.72 
Total 100 
Specific Gravity 0.67 
B.T.U. per cubic ft 1101 
Pressure (psi) 600 to 900 
Temperature (F) 100° to 160° 
Rate MMscF / hour 3.2 to 3.8 
H2O (lbs per MMscF) 180 
 
 
 Table 2 
Chemical Analysis of Pipe Metal Near 
Failure Site (wt.%) 
Fe Balance 
C 0.235 
S 0.013 
Mn 1.05 
Si 1.20 
Cr 0.015 
Ni 0.020 
Cu 0.015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Location of gas-header failure 
(circle), Naval Reserve Gas Plant No. 3. 
Arrow shows direction of gas flow. 
 
Figure 2 – Failure site with section of patch removed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 3 – Failed Header (inverted). Arrows show direction of gas 
flow. Failure is on the left side under the welded metal patch. Note 
welds between the outlet “T” and the two inlets. 
 
Figure 4 – Cutaway of pipe showing location of failure. Color of the 
scale indicates lack of FeCO3 (black scale) at failure location. Arrow 
shows raised weld between inlet section (failure site) and the outlet 
“T”. Notice thinner wall (1/4 inch) on inlet section compared to outlet 
section (3/8 inch). Black bands are welding effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 5 – Micro-hardness test showing decrease in hardness as the 
metal thins. Cross section is from inlet section that did not fail, but had 
analogous conditions to the failure site. 
 
 
Figure 6 – Cross section of the failure site of gas-
header (nital etch). The white areas are ferrite and the 
dark are pearlite. There is an increase in pearlite 
towards the gas side. 
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Figure 9 – Cross section of pipe adjacent to failure showing metal 
thinning and welded patch overlay. Refer to Figure 4 for relative 
location of cross section. 
 
Figure 10 – SEM backscatter image of 
scale near failure showing areas of 
spalling and cracking indicative of the 
low integrity of the scale. Features likely 
associated with impingement of the gas 
flow are also visible. 
  
 
 Figure 11 – SEM backscatter image of 
exterior (painted side) of header near the 
failure. There is evidence of cracking from 
corrosion fatigue under the paint layer. 
 
 
Figure 12 – A “Y” design can reduce 
horizontal surfaces in a gas-header. 
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Internal Corrosion a Big Problem in Natural Gas Pipes
• In 2002 alone, the U.S. Office of Pipeline Safety 
gave $3,711,443 in costs and 17% of all pipeline 
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• Besides the costs, gas pipeline failures due to 
internal corrosion have adverse affects on public 
and workplace health, safety, the environment, 
and production.
Naval Reserve Gas Plant No. 3
Heat 
exchanger
Packed 
Tower
Field gas 
inlet
Free water 
knockout
Compression stages
1st 2nd 3rd
FAILED 
HEADER
Corrosion 
Sensors
Heat 
exchanger 
Gas to Gas
Heat 
exchanger 
Gas to Liquid
ChillerLow Temperature 
Separator
Gas out to Field Injectors
High 
Pressure 
Flash
Inhibitor added (glycol)
100,000 to 300,000 MMscF processed per 
month, removing propane, butane, and higher 
chain carbon compounds for sale and reinjecting
methane and ethane into the gas field.
Methane, ethane
Propane 
storage
Butane/
Gas Mix 
storage
Analysis of Natural Gas 
Composition of  Production Well Naval Reserve Gas Plant No.3 
(source RMOTC)
Component Percent
Air 1.61
CO2 2.67
Methane 86.48
Ethane 5.11
Propane 2.14
Iso-butane 0.26
Normal-butane 0.60
Iso-pentane 0.20
Normal-pentane 0.21
Hexane + 0.72
Total 100
Specific Gravity 0.67
B.T.U. per cubic ft 1101
Pressure (psi) 600 to 900
Temperature (F) 100° to 160°
Rate MMscF / Hour 3.2 to 3.8
H2O (lbs per MMscF) 180
FeCO3 Corrosion Predominates in Natural Gas Pipes
Fe + 2HCO3- FeCO3 + H2O +CO2 + 2e-
FeCO3 scale is normally protective, but may 
become less protective if saturated with water 
or liquid hydrocarbons, or if disturbed by flow 
effects (erosion-corrosion.)
Physical Location of Failure
Failed Header with patch
Direction of gas flow
Corrosion monitoring
Corrosion rate = 5.5 μm/yr (0.22 mpy)
Scale in vertical section: 
FeCO3 (siderite-primary) 
FeS2 (pyrite-secondary) 
FeS (mackinawite-trace) 
(X-ray diffraction)
History of Gas-Header
• Header put in service in February 1984 
(supplier unknown).
• After 20 years, header failed, was patched and 
returned to service.
• Header removed in September 2005 .
• “As received” failed metal was pointing 
inward to gas side. It is believed the welder 
pushed the failed spot into the header to make 
installation of the patch easier (assuming 
ruptured metal originally extended outwards 
from the pressurized pipe).
Failure Site Location Under Welded Patch
This is a 0.250 inch thick pipe in 
service for less than 20 years 
before failing. The corrosion rate 
of > 325 μm/yr (13 mpy) is 60 
times greater than on the vertical 
pipe section a few feet below the 
failed header (5.5 μm/yr). Gas 
composition , temperature and 
flow are the same in the vertical 
section and the failed header.
Close-up of Failure
Variation in Scale type and Thickness Around the Failure
If Corrosion Rate Was Low On Vertical Section, 
Why Did Header Fail So Quickly?
• Design Elements of the Header
• Horizontal Orientation
• Time of Wetness
• Velocity Effects
• Erosion-corrosion (impingement effects)
Gas-header (inverted) Showing Flow Direction
Gas-header Fabricated from 3 Sections
Inlet “T”Inlet “T” Outlet “T”
Welded joints connecting sections
Flange section 
welded to Inlet 
section
Gas-header Showing Position of Welds, 
Orientation, and Gas Flow Direction
Welded joints create 
a raised holdup 
between inlet section 
and outlet preventing 
the flow of liquid 
water to the outlet
Wall thickness of failed inlet section 
0.250” , thinner than wall thickness 
of outlet section (0.375”).
X
Failure Site
Diameter of hole in 
inlet below weld of 
vertical pipe is 
smaller than vertical 
pipe.
Cutaway of Failed Inlet Section of Header
Outlet “T” wall thickness= 0.375”
Inlet “T” wall thickness= 0.250”
Raised weld joint creates barrier 
to water flow to outlet “T”
Dark bands are 
welding effects
Welded Patch
Design Elements of the Header 
Contributing to Failure
• Header welded from three parts rather than 
single part
• Inlet section has thinner wall than outlet 
(0.250 inches vs 0.375 inches)
• Welds provide barrier (holdup), preventing 
liquids from draining to the outlet
• Horizontal orientation makes “low spot” in 
the system, providing an area where liquids 
will persist and not drain
Other (non-failure) side of Gas Header showing 
erosion of corrosion film directly under inlet pipe
Cross section of Right Side Inlet Section
Sample taken parallel to pipe 
length for micro-hardness test
Hardness changes vs Header wall thickness
It is not believed that this 
reduction in hardness 
contributed to the failure.
Changes in metal hardness as 
header wall thickness diminishes
Failure Side of Header Showing Metal Thinning 
and Welded Patch Overlay
Metal Thinning Adjacent to Failure Site
Metal Thinning At Failure 
Exterior 
paintInside 
corrosion 
film
0.4 mm
Mounted Cross Section of Failure Site 
Used in Analysis
Hardness changes vs Header wall thickness
Changes in metal hardness as 
header wall thickness diminishes
Gas Side
Failure Site by Optical Microscopy - natal (98% methanol, 2% HNO3) etch
Gradient of increasing pearlite
towards the Ga  side.
SEM Backscatter Image and X-ray Maps of 
Failure Site
OC
Fe
100 μm
Electron 
backscatter 
image
Relative Amounts of C (Red), O (Green), and Fe (Blue)
EDS X-ray Micro-analysis
(Atomic %)
Fe O C S
1 30.4 45.6 22.4 0.9
2 0.3 25.8 71.0 0.6
3 20.7 58.1 19.8 1.0
4 20.7 47.3 31.3 0.2
5 22.1 48.9 25.9 2.0
6 1.3 17.6 81.0 0.1
7 24.4 63.3 9.7 2.0
8 31.9 52.1 13.3 1.6
9 24.9 49.6 24.7 0.4
1
23
4
5
6
789
X-ray diffraction results for scale near the failure 
found Fe2O3 (hematite-primary), Fe3O4 (magnetite-
secondary), and FeCO3 (siderite-trace)
Gas Flow Effects
Low Magnification SEM Image Shows Gas Flow 
Effects on Scale
Failure Model
To Outlet
To End Cap
Raised Weld Joint
Metal
FeCO3
Water layer Liquid Hydrocarbons
Scale from 
vertical pipe 
above header
To Outlet
To End Cap
Raised Weld Joint
Corrosion film weakened 
by water and hydrocarbons 
is eroded away by gas flow
Failure Model
Conclusions
• The failure was caused by erosion-corrosion. Gas flow was 
directed on an area of active corrosion eroding away the 
protective scale. There was a possibility of two-phase 
impingement from spalled scale from pipe above failure.
• Header design elements contributed to the erosion-
corrosion. The vertical inlet pipe directed gas flow to the 
header wall. A weld between the inlet and outlet sections of 
the header created a barrier (holdup) that prevented liquids 
from draining to outlet.
• Header orientation created a “low-spot” in the system, 
liquid water and hydrocarbons could pool where the failure 
occurred.
Different Header Design Would Solve the Problem
A “Y” shaped header 
would minimize 
horizontal surfaces and 
avoid gas flow directly 
impacting area of active 
corrosion. 
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